

Organization of Gatekeeping and Mental Framework in the System of Representation and Hierarchical Relational Structures of the Modern Society

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Abstract

Critical discourse analysis as a type of social practice reveals how linguistic choices enable speakers to manipulate the realizations of agency and power in the representation of action. The present study examines the relationship between language and ideology and explores how such a relationship is represented in the analysis of spoken text and to show how declarative knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, and ideology act and perform in the representation of macrostructures following Van Dijk's (2005) Knowledge Management Model of Critical Dimension of Discourse Analysis was followed to determine the way in which spoken discourse involves jointly constructed interactions. Results indicate that communication skills are essential to social interaction and contribute to coherent discourse and features of situation affect participants' perceptions and their conscious behavioral decisions.

Keywords: Authority Conception, Conversational Styles, Dominant Ideology, Social Function, Mental Mechanisms, Controllability.

1. Introduction

Language is a reflection of individual and social characteristics which guarantees the evolutionary process of human over time. It is an instrument for establishing social reciprocal acts orienting spoken and written languages. As a representational system, it is able to construct meaning and signify practice, sustain the dialogue between participants which enable them to build a culture of shared understanding and interpret the world. Representation through language is central to the processes by which meaning is produced. Language as the privileged medium in which we make sense of things, in which meaning is exchanged. Meaning can only be shared through our common access to language and culture has always been regarded as the key repository of cultural values and meanings (Hall, 1997: 1). Thompson, ed., (1997) maintain that meanings also regulate and organize our conduct and practice—they help to set the rules, and conventions by which the social life is ordered and governed (as cited in Hall, 1997:40).

Linguistic representations determine the way in which we think about particular objects, events, situations and, as such, function as a principle of action influencing actual social practice (Shapiro, 1988; Fairclough, 1989; Hodge and Kress, 1993; Wodak, 2002; Karlsberg, 2005, as cited in Wenden, 2005: 90). The main focus of Woodward ed., (1997) is that there are systems of representation

which work like languages, because they all use some elements to stand for what we want to say. People use signs and symbols-whether they are sounds, written words, electrically produced images, musical notes, even objects to represent to other people their concepts, ideas, and feelings. Spoken language uses sounds, written language uses words, musical language uses notes on a scale, language of the body uses physical gesture. These components-sounds, words, notes, and gestures are part of our natural and material world. The system is controlled by the dialogue manager, which receives user input and controls message passing between other modules of the system. The static knowledge bases used by the processing modules: they comprise general and domain-specific vocabulary (the lexicon), knowledge of syntactic constructions and their semantic impact (grammar), knowledge of general and domain-specific concepts (domain objects) and knowledge of the communicative events and structures possible in a dialogue (Ahrenberg & Jönsson, 1989; Jönsson & Ahrenberg 1990).

In discourse analysis, representation refers to the language used in a text or talk to assign meaning to groups and their social practices, to events, and to social and ecological conditions and objects (e.g. Fairclough, 1989; 1995; van Dijk, 2002). Implicit in this view of the role of language in social life is that meaning is not embedded in the reality that is perceived but rather that it is construed by linguistic representation (Fairclough, 1992; Goatly, 2000; Halliday, 1990; Hodge & Kress, 1993; Mehan & Wills, 1988; Muntigl, 2002; Shapiro, 1988; van Dijk, 2002; Wenden & Schaffner, 1999; Wodak, 2002).

Meaning gives us a sense of our own identity of who we are and with whom we belong. It is continuously produced and conveyed in every personal and social interaction in which we take part. MacKay (1997) defines *meaning* as “what is produced whenever we express ourselves in, make use of cultural things; that is, when we incorporate them in different ways into the everyday rituals and practices of daily life and gives them value or significance”. Or when we weave narratives, stories, and fantasies around them.

1.1 The Role of Discourse

Discourse involves specific ways of talking which reflects specific ideologies. The ways of thinking and speaking, shape ideologies through which power in society can be distributed.

Discourse structure shows the way in which the information about the themes in the discourse organized or structured. Much of our discourse, especially when we speak as members of groups, expresses ideologically based opinions. We learn most of our ideological ideas by reading and listening to other group members, beginning with our parents and peers. Later we 'learn' ideologies by watching television, reading text books at school, advertising, reading the newspaper, novels

or participating in everyday conversations with friends and colleagues, among a multitude of other forms of talk and text (Van Dijk, 1998: 9).

The dynamic discourse representation needed for a given application can be structured in terms of a tree of dialogue objects (moves, initiative response units). Dialogue objects are divided into three main classes on the basis of structural complexity. There is one class corresponding to the size of a dialogue, another class corresponding to the size of a discourse segment and a third class corresponding to the size of a single speech act, or dialogue move. Thus, a dialogue is structured in terms of discourse segments, and a discourse segment in terms of moves and embedded segments. Utterances are not analyzed as dialogue objects, but as linguistic objects which function as vehicles of one or more moves (Grosz & Sidner, 1986; Allen, 1987: 398f). According to Schegloff (1992,38), "utterances are built to display speakers' understanding; they are made available for coparticipants' inspection to see if they display an adequate understanding of that which they claim to understand."

Semantic interpretation is object-oriented (Hirst, 1987) and concerns the linking of linguistic objects (parts of utterances) to objects (instances, classes, properties) of the universe of discourse, of which the system may have independent knowledge. A pilot system demonstrating the approach to semantic interpretation is described in Ahrenberg (1989b).

In "the order of discourse", Foucault (1981) describes how institutions both support powerful discourse (through pedagogy, books, labs, etc.) and in turn are supported by disciplines and codified ways of thinking. They try to organize and control their power of discourse by regulating who is allowed to speak certain discourse and by discursive policing which allowed certain discourses (i.e., metaphors) to be used at any historical time (p.68). The domain and the complexity and variation of the dialogue will probably also affect the kinds of indexicality that the system has to cope with and even the ways in which reference resolution is done.

Culture marks out and maintains identity within and difference between groups which is a fundamental system full of customs and traditions with cognitive bases, behavioral patterns, speech acts, norms, and especially ideological expectations which construct social identity. The norms and values that organize our actions and evaluations basically define what is good and bad, permitted or prohibited. Although norms and values may be very general, and culturally accepted, they may be applied in different areas and in ways about which controversy is fundamental. (Van Dijk, 1998:15).

This article defines the three research questions (RQ) below, considering the theoretical views on gatekeeping, management, and handling of information, in human communication considering power as an inherent component of virtually any communication context. The research questions rather aim to explore how

interlocutors gather, analyze, and share strategic information related to improving communicative operations:

RQ1: How do hierarchical relations with communication responsibilities, identify or select information?

RQ2: How do hierarchical relations with communication responsibilities, filter or evaluate the selected information?

RQ3: How do hierarchical relations with communication responsibilities, organize this information, and share or distribute it?

1.2 Macro and Micro in Sociology

Van Dijk (1998) made a practical distinction between the macro level and the micro level of description or analysis related to the fields of sociology and discourse studies. At the micro-level, social actors, and the social interaction between them in social situations are specified. The macro level deals with groups of social actors, institutions, organizations, whole states or societies, and their relationships, such as those of power. Since ideologies are shared by a group, whereas the individual opinions of a social actor at a given moment would belong to the micro level of description (p:25).

1.3 Chatterton's (2011) Three Elements Model

Materials: The physical objects that facilitate certain activities to be performed in specific ways.

Meanings: Images, interpretations or concepts associated with activities that determine how and when they might be performed.

Procedures: Skills, know-how or competencies that permit, or lead to activities being undertaken in certain ways.

In addition to power, Donohue, Tichenor, and Olien highlighted control as a fundamental feature of gatekeeping. Elaborating from several references, their view retrieved the human "historic recognition of a fundamental social principle: knowledge is basic to social power, and immense potential for developing power over other human lives rests with those who man the gates in the communication flow" (Donohue, et al., 1972: 41). They argued that the use and control of information is remarkably important to any large social organization.

1.4 Gatekeeping, Labelling and Footing

Gatekeeping is the process by which the billions of messages that are available in the world get cut down and transformed into the hundreds of messages that reach a given person on a given day" (1991, 1). Gatekeeping as a theory of communications began with Lewin's (1951) work on community dynamics and a notion of gatekeeping that was laid out in terms of food consumption—the selection process by which certain foods reach the dinner table, or not. Lewin saw this as a product of "communications channels" and "gates," metaphors well-suited.

Erikson and Schultz (1982) suggesting that gatekeeping encounters are not a neutral and objective sorting process. It is as a game in favor of those individuals whose communication style and social background are most similar to those of the interviewer with whom they talk (p.193).

Differences in the distribution of information before and after some form of mediation or filtering—by individuals or institutions—are of importance throughout political science.

Soroka (2012) believes that filter, or gatekeeping, can be depicted as a distribution as well—a distribution of the likelihood with which a given piece of information is selected for mediation. The consequent gatekeeping effect may be a systematic difference in the degree of negativity in the real world and in media content.

In Agar's (1985) view, most institutional and workplace encounters involve some sort of labelling and sorting process where people are checked through an invisible gate. In service encounters, the institutional representative uses his/her control to fit the client into the organizational ways of thinking about the problem (p.153). The labelling and sorting of people, information and arguments is distributed across many different grouping so that the decision-making process is hard to pin down to one event or encounter (Boden, 1994).

The simulation of equality and the euphemized and cautious talk (Bourdieu, 1991) specify the ways in which authority masks its own power where covert mechanisms of control are sensitive to social relations and submitted for overt marking of power. Goffman's (1951) notion of "footing" delicate interactional footwork that has to be done by participants if they are to manage their professional identities, their roles and moment-to-moment ways of relating to the others. For institutional representatives, their reputation, face saving are sensitive to face loss in others, has to be managed within what is widely recognized as asymmetrical relations in most institutional interaction. Institutional talk takes on a special kind of asymmetry when both sides do not share the grounds for negotiating understanding.

There are certain distinctions to be made between institutional and professional discourse (Sarangi and Roberts,1999). The latter is acquired by professionals as they become teachers, doctors, human resources personnel and so on. Professional discourse is a form of "habitus " (Bourdieu,1991), a set of linguistic practices and conventionalized behavior and values that the professional has to acquire mastery.

Institutional discourse, by contrast, is formed by the wider ideologies and, following the critical theorist Habermas (1979), is also characterized by relational, legitimate accounting practices which are authoritatively backed up by a set of rules and regulations governing an institution. The gatekeeping functions of election, assessment and training rely on institutional discourse (Sarangi & Slembruck,

1996). Institutional discourse cannot be uncoupled from powerful discourse, institutional relations, ideologies, and categories assume a hierarchy of knowledge, status and degree of belonging which produce asymmetrical interactions. The three major themes include: the degree of control over the content of talk, the allocation of turns: the special inferencing; the differential distribution of participation rights (Drew & Heritage, 1992; Thornborrow, 2002). Dominant ideologies are the basis of the mental dimension of control and dominant group members' practices in the reproduction or legitimization of their dominance by the ruling class, or by various elite groups or organizations, if power is defined here in terms of the control one group has over another group.

2. Mental Models

Van Dijk (2005) believes that our personal, individual, autobiographical memory is 'episodic' because it is made up of the mental representations of the episodes that give rise to our daily experiences, from the moment we wake up in the morning, until we fall asleep at night. These episodic representations of the daily events, actions, and situations we participate in, witness (in reality or on TV), or read about, are called (mental) models.

2.1 Mental Models Are Subjective

In other words, the way we perceive, understand or interpret our daily reality takes place through the construction or reconstruction (updating or modification) of such models. Models are therefore personal and subjective: They represent the way I see and understand events. Such a representation is often influenced by previous experiences (old models), and the ways these may bias my current perceptions and interpretations. Models also embody opinions about the events we participate in, witness or read and hear about. Thus, reading the newspaper about the civil wars, we not only form mental models of the events, but probably also associate these with negative opinions about the war crimes and 'ethnic cleansing' being perpetrated in these wars.

2.2 The Structure of Mental Models

In Van Dijk's (1998) perspective, the abstract schema that we use in the interpretation of the millions of events we have experienced in our lives should on the one hand be relatively simple, that is, consist only of a few, fixed categories, but on the other hand, it should be rather flexible and allow application to less current situations with which we are confronted in everyday life. Thus, we may assume that model schemata for events feature categories such as Setting (Time, Place), Participants (Things, People) and some occurrence. Models of actions more specifically feature participants who are actors in various roles (agents, patients, etc.). Despite the multiplicity of factors involved in the construction of the mental models of everyday life experiences, and despite the personal and contextual variations these may imply, mental models also at the same time exhibit fragments

of socially shared ideologies. Such schemata allow fast, strategic processing of relevant information and (provisional) interpretation (p, 21).

Ideologies are organized sets of fundamental and often normative ideas and attitudes about some aspect of social reality shared by members of a group, society or culture. They are used to frame, legitimate, or validate opinions and actions in the domain to which they are applicable. The ideology that underlies the main themes and shapes responses, is justified. Thus, indirectly, they control how people plan and understand their social practices, including their use of language. Ideologies persist over time. They are unconscious and rarely questioned, and when they are, their common sense nature is offered as adequate explanation of their existence (Bloomart & Verschueren, 1998; Fairclough, 1989; Hodge & Kress, 1993; Van Dijk, 1999, (as cited in Wenden,2005:93). Ideologies consist of socially shared beliefs that are associated with the characteristic properties of a group, such as their identity, their position in society, their interests and aims, their relations to other groups, their reproduction, and their natural environment. Ideologies consist of shared, social beliefs, and not of personal opinions. Moreover, they are often about important social and political issues, namely those issues that are relevant for a group and its existence, rather than about trivial everyday things like the color of our car, or the brand of our computer.

3. Method

Ideologies are about life and death, birth and reproduction, as the conflicting attitudes about abortion and euthanasia show. They are about people and their health in relation to their natural environment, as is obvious in ecological ideologies. They are about class, about being poor or rich, having power or having nothing.

Basic and socially shared ideologies may influence the personal beliefs in our episodic memory which is personal, subjective and consist of specific experiences This is the kind of 'memory' we speak about in everyday life. Episodic memory is the location of the things we 'remember'. Since episodic memories are about individual people themselves, Self plays a central role in them (Van Dijk,1998: 11-12).

3.1 *Van Dijk'S (2005) Model of Knowledge Management in CDA*

Van Dijk (2005) believes that cognition is a necessary interface between society and discourse, and secondly that the cognitive structures we deal with are at the same time social, as is the case for knowledge, attitudes, ideologies, norms and values. Indeed, these social cognitions are primarily defined in terms of the beliefs shared by members of groups and communities. It is also within this perspective that we defined knowledge not as personal beliefs, but as social beliefs certified, shared and hence discursively presupposed by the members of epistemic communities. The conditions formulated above for the management of knowledge of discourse are in

that sense social in a double sense, namely as beliefs that are socially shared, on the one hand, and because they are managed by context models that are representations of communicative situations, on the other hand.

We have seen at the same time, however, that these mental models are at the same time personal, even when also socially based, because they must of course integrate the individual personal experiences, aims and interests of language users. It is also in this sense that language is inherently social, but of course used with individual variation in concrete social situation. Only in this way can we both explain the social, cultural and political dimensions of discourse, and the unique, individual variation of each specific instance of text and talk. That is, a sociocognitive approach to discourse offers a unique and necessary interface between the macro aspects of society, and the micro aspects of discourse and interaction. Such a theoretical framework is also crucial for a more critical perspective. CDA specifically deals with the study of the discursive reproduction of power abuse, with forms of domination and social inequality. This also means that CDA needs to make explicit the way socially shared beliefs are discursively reproduced and how such beliefs are abused in the maintenance and legitimation of domination. The conventional categories that define the ideological schema should probably be derived from the basic properties of the social group. That is, if ideologies underlie the social beliefs of a group, then the identity and identification of group members must follow a more or less fixed pattern of basic categories, together with flexible rules of application. Thus, we briefly assumed above that the following categories reflect rather fundamental categories of group life and identity, categories that may be good candidates for the schema that organizes the ideologies of the same group:

3.1.1 Ideological Knowledge

Knowledge may be affected by ideology. Group-knowledge is dependent on group-ideology, and such dependence may be evaluated more or less positively or negatively. Knowledge may also be controlled by more positive ideological principles. Thus, much of the knowledge we today have about pollution is undoubtedly formulated under the influence of ecological ideologies. (Van Dijk, 1998: 19). If ideologies control the social representations of groups, they also control the knowledge acquired and shared by a group. This is true, however, only for a specific kind of knowledge, namely what we shall call group knowledge (Ibid:15).

3.1.2 Ideological Attitudes

There are 'intermediary' representations between ideologies and discourse. Attitudes as forms of social cognition, may embody ideological propositions as applied to specific social domains. For instance we may 'apply' a feminist ideology

in the area of the labor market, in education, or in the area of reproduction or sexuality.

To present some ideas about the ideological basis of context models, we shall only briefly mention some further contextual categories here:

Domain. People need to be aware of the global social domain in which they are speaking. Politicians in parliament know they are now doing politics and hence in the domain of Politics, and teachers are aware they are in Education, as judges are aware they are in the area of Law.

Roles. Participants may have many different roles which may affect the production and comprehension of discourse. We assume that there are three basic types of role that are contextually relevant: communicative roles, interactional roles and social roles. Participants obviously need to represent themselves and other participants as speakers/writers or recipients, as well as various production roles in institutional situations (for instance in the mass media: writers, editors, actual speakers) and recipient roles (destinatory, overhearer). Interactional roles need to be represented in order to be able to account for various situational positions, such as friends and enemies, proponents and opponents as is the case for speakers in parliament. Social roles account for group membership.

Social Relations. The participants may have different models of these relationships, as is typically the case in relations of dominance). Again, this is a vast area of representation, running from the overall categories such as formal and informal, to such relationships as those of power or authority.

Power. Power related to ideology. Social power defined in terms of control, that is, the power of a group A over another group B. Usually this means the control of action: A is able to control (limit, prohibit) the actions of B. Since discourse is also a form of action, such control may also be exercised over discourse and its properties: its context, its topic, or its style. Because such discourse may also influence the mind of the recipients, powerful groups may --indirectly, for instance through the mass media -- also control the minds of other people. Powerful discourse may influence the way we define an event or situation in our mental models, or how we represent society in our knowledge, attitudes and ideologies.

Cognition. Finally, contexts need to be defined in cognitive terms, namely in terms of the goals, knowledge and other beliefs of the participants. The knowledge component is the very basis of a host of semantic and pragmatic properties of discourse, such as implications and presuppositions: The speaker must know what the recipient already knows in order to be able to decide what propositions of a mental model or of the social representations are known to the recipients. And recipients need to know the same about the speaker or writer in order to establish what is actually intended in implicit, indirect, ironic or other non-explicit forms of talk. In his view, the most important interface between ideologies

and discourse: mental models as represented in episodic memory. Mental models are not only important for the representation of our personal experiences. They are also the basis of the production and comprehension of action and spoken discourse.

Chilton and Schaffner (2002: 5) define politics “as a struggle for power, between those who seek to assert and maintain their power and those who seek to resist it” on the one hand, and on the other “as cooperation, as the practices and institutions a society has for resolving clashes of interest over money, power, liberty and the like” (as cited in Wenden, 2005:89).

Van Dijk (1997) maintains that 'political discourse' is identified by its actors or authors, viz., politicians. Politicians in this sense are the group of people who are being paid for their (political) activities, and who are being elected or appointed as the central players in the politics. But we therefore should also include the various recipients in political communicative events, such as the public, the people, and citizens. All these groups and individuals, as well as their organizations and institutions, may take part in the political process, and many of them are actively involved in political discourse. How participants define the interaction, and what knowledge, beliefs or aims are activated during conversation depend on the situation. These typical context features may in turn show up at all levels of discourse, e.g. in intonation, sentence syntax, lexical selection, topicalization or implicitness, among many other properties of talk. A syntactic form signals not simply the prior presence of a specific ideological selection, it also expresses the meaning or content of the ideological choice.

Ideologies form the basis of the social representations and practices of group members, including their discourse, which at the same time serves as the means of ideological production.

Van Dijk (2006) believes that ideologies have to be learned and changed by individuals as group members. Persons may be members of several groups, and thus have to learn various ideologies during their life.

Reciprocity, broadly defined as “an exchange between two or more actors for mutual benefit, is a defining feature of social life, the very “starting mechanism” through which social relations can be initiated and perpetuated” (Gouldner. 1960: 177). Reciprocity is considered a key ingredient for the development of trust, connectedness, and social capital—the bundle of normative expectations and networked resources that are critical for the formation and maintenance of community ties (Granovetter 1973; Putnam 2000).

Human beings are all mutually, or reciprocally, dependent on others for social exchange. As Molm and her colleagues (Molm, Schaefer, & Collett, 2007) point out, the value of reciprocity lies both in the instrumental and symbolic outcomes. Instrumental values are those goods (i.e., gifts, conversation, attention, favors, etc.) that are gained through reciprocity. Symbolic values are the positive

thoughts, perceptions, and behaviors that may be communicated by reciprocation or observed by others.

In the given examples we have tried to give examples of utterance sequences where either the first or the second is more specific than the others. In the following instances, although two assertions are involved, the second assertion functions as an explanation of the first one:

Tom's Dad: You have acted stupidly. You asked for my opinion.

The most obvious coherence relation at pragmatic level is again that of conditional connection, as we suggested above: acts are carried out which make acts possible, more plausible or even, socially necessary. This is particularly clear in dialogues where conditioning exhibits itself sometimes in the form of rights or duties, as e.g. in:

Alex: I don't know what to do. I can't pay my rent this month.

John: You want to borrow some money from me?

There is no straightforward way in which we can say that a given utterance type is more general or more specific than another, unless the set of appropriateness conditions of the one is a subset of that of the other as the examples where this might be the case:

Student: Be sure I will come soon. That is, I will try.

Principal: That is not bad at all.

The interactive moves they represent in a strategic interaction, may be assigned various functions, such as opposing, facilitating, reducing, objecting, (dis)agreeing, (dis-)approving, etc., as in:

Police Officer: Stay here!

Addicted Man: I do what I want!

Police Officer: I tell you to stop smoking!

Addicted Man: Who are you to advise me?

Police Officer: Oh, fuck you! Why are you so rude?

These simple examples clearly show that speech act sequences, taken as moves in the respective turns of a conversation may also be categorized functionally.

Sometimes sellers' persistence and patience is rewarded. They have special secrets for getting to the decision makers of the customers to buy goods and products.

Manager: I have people call me all day and you are the first one I've allowed to come in to show me your product-because you were so nice to my staff.

Here the listener as the seller should let him know how much the product seller appreciate his professionalism and his assistance. Being rude to these intermediaries is ineffective.

In selling process, learning to listen more than to speak is better. Let the other party take the opening position. The seller should listen carefully to the customers' thoughts and concerns. For example, when the car salesman asks:

A: What do you need?

B: Great question! How low can you go?

A: I need for you to give me a number; then I'll ask how close we can get.

B: Wow, you're a great seller! I still need for you to go to your manager and see how he can go.

Ultimately, the salesperson comes back and names a price of 3 thousand dollars below the sticker price.

Secretary: Hello thank you for calling Black industries. How can I help you?

Salesperson: Hi, I am trying reach the person that over sees operations. Can you point me in the right direction?

Secretary: May I ask what this call is in regard to?

Salesperson: Sure, well the reason why I am calling is that we help business to improve their ability to manage employee's schedules.

In this example the gatekeeper delivered one of their favorite objections and "What is this call is in regard to?". At that point they know to get rid of you as you are a salesperson trying to sell something.

The roles of utterances are defined in terms of interaction categories, such as, the contribution to the realization of a goal of the other speaker (helping, facilitating, approving), or a negative reaction or interference with respect to the intentions or purposes of the speaker (protesting, disapproving, objecting, etc.).

4. Discussion and Conclusion

Notions such as prediction, sequencing rules, adjacency pair, and sequential implicativeness determine discourse as composed of elements of a sequence. However, they cannot explain the complexity of longer stretches, written or oral, as they leave out the fact that some discourse elements may be intended and/or perceived as more "important" than others, and that this prominence is not necessarily connected with the elements' relative positions in the sequence. With reference to the problem of subordinaron or superordination of acts within a move, Aston (1977: 482 ff.) proposes to identify the relationship (which he terms "interactive") between two components with the answer to the question "What did the addresser do in performing act B which he could not have been said to have done if act A had not previously been performed?" The notion of interactivity involves contextual considerations; the function of act B is defined with respect to another act A. If A were absent, B would be interpreted differently.

As Van Dijk (1998) maintains, accessing to public discourse is so important which specifies who controls public discourse, indirectly controls the minds (including the ideologies) of people, and therefore also their social practices. The

relation between social power, discourse, the mind and control should be taken into account. In a more critical approach to power, we are especially interested in power abuse or dominance, and how ideologies may be used to legitimate such dominance.

In Van Dijk's (2006) view, ideologies as the beginning and end, the source and the goal, of group practices, provide the principles by which these forms of power abuse may be justified, legitimized, condoned or accepted. They develop as mental forms of group (self-) identification, and in relation to other groups. It is only within and between groups that ideologies make sense, and not at the level of society as a whole.

Mehan (1993) maintains that gatekeeping decisions are interactionally produced but also product of "politics of representation" in which people of various positions attempt to capture or dominate modes of representation... if successful, a hierarchy is formed, in which one mode of representing the world... gains primacy over others, transforming modes of representation. The modes include technical jargons as the means of classifying and coding events and people and the way in which institutional representatives speak for the institution (p.241).

Conversation analysts (cf. Heringer 1977; Schegloff 1980; Levinson 1983), though primarily concerned with sequential aspects of interaction, also acknowledge a hierarchical organisation within a move.

Roulet et al. (1987) propose the formal classification of discourse in terms of the number of producers (dialogal/monological discourse) with a functional one which distinguishes between monologic and dialogic discourse. In monologic discourse components are linked through interactive relations and have, therefore, the hierarchical structure of a move; in dialogic discourse they are linked through illocutionary functions and have the linear structure of an exchange (cited in Stoll, 1996:127).

With respect to the raised questions of the study, the results indicated that there is a relationship between behavior, individuals and the social and physical environments in which they occur. Behavior as an outcome of complex inter-relationships and shared social practice. Individuals perform behaviors that are themselves a product of relationships between people, their environment, and the technology that surrounds them. The gatekeeping function, is of course not often directly observable, but we can in certain circumstances measure both real-world indicators and the content of medium. This article used simple probability distributions to understand and then empirically examine the effects of gatekeeping and to explore the consequent systematic differences between news content and the real world.

Language as a means of empowerment, can rebalance a relationship. how discourse intervention can contribute to social transformation. Textual structures are the product of choices of linguistic system. Aspects such as unit, hierarchy, and the

symbolic context together can potentially cover the analysis of discourse meaning. The findings indicate that linguistic structures and discourse can be comprehended through ideologies. In a communication, it is so important to discover what ideologies various themes have and how they are legitimized. Institutions can use their knowledge discourse and increase their power. In a dialogical discourse, communicational reality changes based on speakers' power or influence. Analyzing a text is more complicated than spoken language level due to abstractness of semantic components. Each level has its own particular difficulties and complexities with ambiguity which can be reduced in the next interrelated texts with much more awareness. As a results, such different linguistic layers should be taken into account.

Ideologies may be developed because they organize social representations. Since at the level of groups, people are better able to form groups based on identification along various criteria, including sharing the same ideology. As the social function of ideologies, they facilitate joint action, interaction and cooperation of in-group members, as well as communications with outgroup members. These would be the social micro-level functions of ideologies due to the fact that they indirectly control social practices and discourse. Ideologies at the macro-level are most commonly described in terms of group relations, like those of power and dominance.

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