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Research Paper

Attitudinal Positioning and Journalistic Commentary in Politically Fraught Circumstances: Editorializing About the Killing of Osama bin Laden

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Abstract

This study explores the strategic use of resources for conveying attitudinal assessments by journalists when their communicative options are seriously curtailed—when there are severe social, legal, or political constraints on what they can say about powerful people and institutions. It offers, by way of a case study, an analysis of editorials published in two Pakistani English-language newspapers the day after the US forces covertly entered Pakistan and killed Osama bin Laden. Whereas these actions raised serious questions about the prior conduct of the Pakistani military and intelligence services, the journalists were prevented by strict legal prohibitions from any overt criticism. Through an appraisal-framework analysis, this study describes the ‘oblique’ attitudinal style used in the two editorials to advance cases which position readers to view those involved in an extremely negative light.

Keywords: Appraisal; Attitude; Commentary; Censorship; Journalism

1. Introduction

This study offers an account of how journalists may make strategic use of attitude-associated linguistic resources in difficult political circumstances. It explores the choices journalistic commentators may make when deploying the options available for positioning readers to positive or negative viewpoints when their purpose is to argue a problematic case, an argument which might make them vulnerable to sanctions from their society’s most powerful institutions. More specifically it reports an analysis of the attitudinal workings of editorials published in two English-language Pakistani newspapers on May 2, 2011, the day after the US reported that its forces had covertly entered Pakistan and killed Al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden. Osama bin Laden had reportedly been in hiding in a large, walled compound in the heavily fortified and garrison city of Abbottabad.

Whereas these editorials have intrinsic interest on their own account, dealing with incidents which are arguably still highly significant not just for the people of Pakistan but the international community more widely, this is not the primary reason they have been chosen for close analysis in this paper. The circumstances surrounding the killing of Osama bin Laden seemed to raise serious questions (or to confirm suspicions) around the prior conduct of the Pakistani political elite, and in particular the military (including the intelligence services). And yet, the power of these institutions (enshrined in Pakistan’s constitution) and their ‘untouchable’ status in Pakistani society meant that there were extremely severe constraints, including legal prohibitions, on any criticisms being levelled against them¹. This was our reason for choosing these texts for close analysis, one account of them constituting the relatively rare case of newspapers choosing to publish editorials critical of a nation’s political and military élites even when such criticism risked being deemed illegal and at odds with the nation’s constitution. We felt that such texts would provide extremely interesting data for a study of just what use authors make of the resources for positioning readers attitudinally when the options for arguing a case are so obviously circumscribed. We thought it would provide interesting new insights into the nature and workings of evaluative meanings generally and into options available for arguing cases in politically fraught circumstances.



2. The Data

All the mainstream Pakistani English-language dailies published editorials on the killing of Osama bin Laden. These newspapers are typically seen as spanning a diversity of cultural, political, and ideological perspectives, from the more conservative (e.g., more likely to be supportive of government) to the more 'liberal' (e.g., more likely to question government policies). We chose to consider for analysis editorials from *Dawn* and *The Nation*, not so much on account of these outlets' perceived political orientation, but on account of the two editorials representing very different positions taken on the killing of Osama bin Laden and the role played by the US and the Pakistani authorities in these events. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that *Dawn* is typically regarded as somewhat 'liberal in its ideological orientation (though not the most liberal of the English language newspapers) and *The Nation* as more conservative. The two editorials are provided here, by way of a precursor to the discussion which follows:

Dawn

Headline: Osama bin Laden

(1) He is dead, and his demise marks the end of an era. (2) America has finally killed the man whose pursuit had consumed the country for almost a decade, an extremist who inspired even more violence than he himself perpetuated. (3) In many ways 9/11, Osama bin Laden's signature attack, has come to define the last 10 years. (4) It has shaped US foreign policy to a greater degree than any other development of the decade and led to two major wars, one of which continues today. (5) It has resulted in gross violations of human rights in the name of the 'war on terror.' (6) It has transformed Pakistan and Afghanistan, dragging them into ideological divides and violence. (7) The latter has claimed many more thousands of lives than were lost on 9/11. (8) All of this can be traced, directly or through those inspired by him, to Osama bin Laden, a former jihadi fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan who later decided that American interference in the Muslim world justified indiscriminate violence against the US and those Muslim nations cooperating with it.

(9) As far back as 1992, an Al-Qaeda affiliate attacked American soldiers in Yemen and, in 1996, Osama bin Laden declared war on America and went on to blow up US embassies in Africa and the USS Cole. (10) But it was not until 9/11 that the world woke up to what the man was capable of. (11) By then, it was too late, and in the years that followed organisations supported or inspired by him sprang up across the world, slaughtering both Muslims and non-Muslims in their anti-Americanism. (12) That said, Al-Qaeda had already been weakened significantly because the American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and the effects of Osama bin Laden's defeat should not be overstated. (13) The groups his ideology has generated continue to plot attacks, especially in Pakistan.

(14) As dramatic as this saga was the end itself, a tale of patient sleuthing resulting in a high-risk operation that is the stuff of spy flicks. (15) It took years for American spies to track down a courier working for Osama bin Laden based on information revealed by Guantanamo detainees and, then, months to confirm that Osama bin Laden was living in the compound. (16) For this detective work and the successful operation, credit must go to American intelligence and special forces. (17) But the event also raises a slew of questions about the level of cooperation with Pakistani intelligence and the military. (18) Were they taken into confidence? (19) If so, at what point? (20) Were they consulted or simply informed? (21) Did they play a role in the operation? (22) If the attempt was purely an American one, were Pakistani radars jammed or dodged? (23) If so, does this point to a failure of Pakistani defence systems? (24) As long as the lack of official disclosure persists, conspiracy theories will continue to spread fear and suspicion here at home.

(25) As for Pakistan, the time for denial is over. (26) Osama bin Laden was not holed up in a cave in the tribal agencies. (27) He was living in a large house surrounded by high walls topped with barbed wire in a garrison town housing a military academy. (28) The idea that the world's most wanted criminal was spending his days there unnoticed by Pakistani intelligence requires either suspension of disbelief or the conclusion that the authorities are guilty of a massive intelligence failure. (29) Both hypotheses are disturbing. (30) If the former is true, the state must realise that extremist ideology has killed thousands of Pakistanis and that there needs to be a single-minded effort against it rather than a selective approach that has failed to keep the country safe. (31) And if the oversight was a matter of incompetence, the authorities need to improve their game drastically.

(32) In the years immediately following 9/11, Pakistani intelligence and police worked closely with the CIA to take out a number of Al-Qaeda leaders, almost all of whom were found in cities rather than the tribal areas. (33) This is something we clearly know how to do but no longer seem interested in, with the result that the US no longer trusts us enough to

plan an operation jointly, even in such high-stakes circumstances, on Pakistani territory. (34) As positive a development as Osama bin Laden's removal is, for the Pakistani state it should be a moment for deep and honest reflection.

The Nation

Headline: Bin Laden dies again

(1) President Obama's announcement that Osama bin Laden was 'slain in his luxury hideout in Pakistan' last night sets Washington's seal of confirmation on the death of a man who, the US believed, had struck at the heart of the American mainland with gruesome effect. (2) Thus, the countless hours the multiple US intelligence agencies used to locate his whereabouts and, as estimated by Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz and other celebrated American economists, the three trillion dollars the Pentagon spent on the war against Iraq alone, not to talk of the expense on the Afghanistan invasion, have now borne fruit. (3) US officials maintain that the operation was 'so secretive that no foreign officials were informed in advance, and only a small circle inside the administration was aware of what was unfolding half a world away.' (4) They also stated that 'the CIA tracked Osama bin Laden to his location; then, elite troops from Navy SEAL Team Six, a top military counterterrorism unit, flew to the hideout in four helicopters.' (5) And, Osama was shot in the head.

(6) There is no mention of Pakistan's involvement in the operation that took place at Abbottabad, barely 100 yards from the Kaul military academy, but some sources claim that it was carried out jointly.

(7) Interestingly, considering the details being given out of the hideout, there is little doubt that it does not suit a person with a head money as high as \$50 million. (8) A large custom-built \$1 million mansion, with a surrounding wall tall enough to hide the ground floor and reinforced with barbed wire, and two heavily-guarded security gates would easily attract suspicion from not only intelligence agencies but also the ordinary folks. (9) Besides, it was housing, so the US story goes, Osama bin Laden, his three wives, seven sons and several guards. (10) Al-Qaeda leader was killed along with one of his sons and three guards, and the rest were arrested. (11) Unquestionably, to the Americans all were identifiable objects or did they never step out of their home? (12) But that would set tongues wagging, confirm the suspicion of mystery around the place and prompt serious investigation. (13) Then, the released picture of dead Osama does not show the age he must be in at this time.

(14) The drama, it seems, has been staged to put the blame of hiding him on Pakistan. (15) That would give credibility to the accusation that it provides sanctuaries to other Al-Qaeda operatives who are behind the deaths of US and NATO soldiers. (16) Already, the Indian Home Minister has picked up the hint and said that Pakistan has sanctuaries of terrorists. (17) These tactics would tend to provide justification for more drone attacks and more intense pressure on Islamabad to send its forces to North Waziristan. Whereas the death of Osama, as Marine Colonel Bob Pappas has been saying for years, might have taken place at Tora Bora on December 13, 2001, or any time later, as other media reports suggested, its 'occurrence' now would boost the morale of the GIs losing the war in Afghanistan.

The public opinion in the US might, perhaps, for a while, forget the economic pressures they are under and Mr Obama's popularity might improve. (20) But, most important, would it affect Al-Qaeda and Taliban, cut off from Osama bin Laden for long and operating on their own, in the execution of their plans? (21) Highly improbable!

Perhaps, it needs to be noted that editorials are offered as the views of the newspaper as a corporate entity and, accordingly, are not by-lined. They entail the newspaper, as an institution, advancing a view. They potentially, therefore, have a higher status or carry more moral weight than would opinion pieces of individual, named columnists.

The two texts clearly are different with respect to their primary attitudinal targets. The *Dawn* editorial primarily positions the reader to take a negative view of the Pakistani military and intelligence services, whereas *The Nation's* negativity is primarily directed towards the US. Whereas there are other targets for attitudinal assessment, for example, the just deceased Osama bin Laden, space limitations preclude us from any detailed consideration of attitudinal positioning around these textually less central targets. Our focus, therefore, is very largely on how the *Dawn* editorial deploys evaluative language resources to advance the view that the Pakistani authorities have been found wanting (despite the constraints outlined above on such a case being argued) and on how *The Nation* deploys these resources to advance the view that the US's report of its killing of Osama bin Laden is highly suspect (despite the US's status as a global superpower and its ability to undertake lethal military action around the globe).

3. Analytical Framework

To explore how these positions are advanced, we referenced the account of the options for conveying or activating positive or negative assessments provided in the appraisal-framework literature (e.g., Macken-Horarik, 2003; Martin & White 2005; Martin, 2000, 2003; White, 1998, 2002). In this account, the evaluative meaning-making resources are grouped into three subsystems: attitude, engagement, and graduation. The attitude system covers meanings by which positive or negative assessments are conveyed or activated—meanings by which addressees are positioned to favourably or unfavourably view participants, processes or situations. This attitudinal positioning may be undertaken via the use of explicitly positive or negative lexis (termed ‘inscription’) or via implication, suggestion or association (termed ‘invocation’). The following subtypes of attitude are recognized—assessment via positive/negative emotional reaction or mood (**affect**), positive/negative assessments of human behaviour and character by reference to social norms (**judgement**) and positive/negative assessment of the aesthetic qualities or the social value of entities, processes or situations (**appreciation**). The engagement subsystem covers options available in English for dialogistic positioning—options by which the speaker adopts a position with respect to that are presented as prior utterances on the current topic or indicates anticipations of responses to the current proposition. More specifically, these are options by which speakers may, for example, present a proposition as a universally accepted ‘given,’ may present themselves as fending off an alternative proposition or may present as acknowledging the contingent subjectivity of the proposition they are advancing and hence recognize the legitimacy of alternative propositions. The graduation system covers option by which the force of propositions can be upscaled or downscaled or by which the boundaries of semantic categories can be blurred or sharpened. In this paper, however, we are largely only concerned with the editorial writers use of the resources for conveying attitudes.

The appraisal-framework literature identifies further subtypes (a more delicate taxonomy) for each of these three systems of attitude. Of relevance for our current purpose is the system of subtypes of **judgement**. This is as follows:

The **judgement** system—in English:

1. **normality** (behaviour viewed positively or negatively on account of being assessed as usual or unusual—note the reader can be positioned to take either a negative or positive view of behaviour characterized as ‘unusual’)
2. **capacity** (assessment of behaviour as being adequate/inadequate re skill, strength, intelligence, etc.)
3. **tenacity** (assessments of behaviour as indicative of appropriate or inappropriate psychological disposition—being appropriately/inappropriately engaged, active, committed, attentive, etc.)
4. **veracity** (assessments of honesty/dishonesty)
5. **propriety** (behaviour assessed as ethically wrong or right)²

The system is set out in tabulated form in Table 1:

Table 1. *System of Judgement (Based on Extending; Iedema, Feez, & White, 1994 and Martin & White, 2005)*

Judgements: Positive/Negative Assessments of Human Behaviour and Character		
	Positive	Negative
Social Esteem	<i>laudable—to applaud; to esteem</i>	<i>illaudable—to deprecate, criticize</i>
Normality	to act normally, outstandingly, in a remarkable manner, etc.	to act peculiarly, oddly, eccentrically, abnormally, weirdly, etc.
Capacity	to act competently, skilfully, powerfully, intelligently gracefully, wittily—to be insightful, successful, victorious, etc.	to act incompetently, weakly, stupidly, foolishly, unintelligently, clumsily - to be unsuccessful, defeated, etc.
Tenacity	to act pluckily, heroically, courageously, devotedly, resolutely, determinedly, attentively, self-reliantly, etc.	to act rashly, apathetically, obstinately, vexatiously, lazily, servilely, complacently, in a cowardly manner, etc.
	Positive	Negative
Social Sanction	<i>to be assessed as a ‘good person’/‘right’ behaviour (institutional endorsement)</i>	<i>to be assessed as a ‘bad person’—‘wrong’ behaviour—‘wrongdoing.’ (institutional condemnation)</i>



Veracity	to communicate/act honestly, truthfully, openly, genuinely, credibly—to be authentic, etc.	to communicate/act deceitfully, dishonestly, fraudulently, deceptively, bogusly—to dissemble, to lie, etc.
Propriety	to act ethically, morally, generously, loyally, kindly, sensitively, considerately, forgivingly, compassionately, etc.	to act wrongfully, unethically, evilly, sinfully, meanly, cruelly, unkindly, greedily, corruptly, unforgivingly, insensitively, inconsiderately, shamefully, uncompassionately, etc.

As indicated in the table, these different subtypes of **judgement** are further grouped into two broad categories—**social esteem** vs. **social sanction**. To characterize behaviour with respect to **capacity**, **tenacity** or **normality** is to construe it as laudable or illaudable, to present it as applaudable or to criticize it. Thus, such assessments relate to the ‘esteem’ with which the assessed human agent is held, or the ‘lack of esteem.’ However, to laud someone for their **tenacity**, **capacity** or **normality** is not to characterize them as a ‘good person.’ That is the domain of the values of **social sanction**—the domain of verdicts with respect to sanctioning of behaviour by reference to secular or religious codes of ethics and legalities (**veracity** and **propriety**). Accordingly, we might say, ‘She’s a good person—she’s always kind and considerate.’ but not ‘She’s a good person—she’s intelligent and successful in her career.’ Similarly, to criticize someone for a lack of **tenacity**, **capacity** or **normality** is to assess them as lacking esteem, but not to characterize them as a ‘bad person.’ That again is the domain of the values of **social sanction**. Thus, we might say, ‘She’s a bad person—she’s cruel and unkind to her children’ but not ‘She’s a bad person—she’s stupid and weird.’ Assessments of **social sanction** are, therefore, more highly charged interpersonally and socially than assessment of **social esteem**, since, unlike assessments of **social esteem**, they involve behaviour in accordance with, or in breach of, norms of behaviour which are institutionally codified. To negatively assess someone as dishonest (negative **veracity**) or corrupt (negative **propriety**) puts more at stake interpersonally and socially than, for example, to assess them as stubborn (negative **tenacity**), unintelligent (negative **capacity**) or weird (negative **normality**).

4. Key Findings

Via the analyses outlined below, we observed significant commonalities across the two editorials with respect to how the resources of evaluative meaning making were deployed to position the reader vis-à-vis each text’s primary attitudinal target—the Pakistani military in the case of *Dawn*, and the US in the case of *The Nation*. We propose that this common evaluative arrangement or syndrome—what can be seen as each text’s ‘evaluative key,’ following Martin and White 2005— can be characterized as attitudinal circumspection or obliqueness. We propose that this is a strategic use of a subset of the resources for activating attitudinal assessments which can plausibly be related to the politically constrained circumstances outlined above.

The key features of this common attitudinal orientation or syndrome are as follows.

(1). In both texts, there is very strong tendency to favour the invoking rather than the inscribing of attitudinal assessment—noteworthy in that it is usually a feature of opinion journalism (commentary articles and editorials) to make liberal use of inscribed options from the system of attitude, and in particular inscribed **judgement**, both **social sanction** and **social esteem** (see Iedema et al., 1994, Martin & White, 2005; White, 1998). Even whereas the central concern of both editorials was with perceived wrongdoing on the part of their primary attitudinal targets (the Pakistan authorities in the case of *Dawn* and the US in the case *The Nation*), both editorials avoided ever explicitly accusing their attitudinal targets of impropriety (i.e., no instances of inscribed negative *social sanction/judgement*). Instead, they either deployed invocations of negative judgement, or used instances of inscribed negative social esteem to position the reader to take a negative view of the attitudinal target (this point is developed further below). There were far fewer instances of inscribed attitude, and these were typically supported by invocations which preceded and supported the inscription which followed.

(2). As just indicated, in the *Dawn* editorial, this attitudinal obliqueness involved either this preference for invocation over inscription or a tendency to find alternatives to inscribed negative judgement/social sanction. As will be outlined in detail below, this could involve formulations by which the assessment was one of **appreciation**. This involved the use of what Halliday terms ideational metaphor (Halliday, 1994, p. 343) by which what might, otherwise, be formulated as actions (e.g., human behaviour) can be formulated as abstract or virtual entities without agents/actors, for example, ‘successful operation’ and ‘intelligence failure.’ This meant that rather than directly assessing the behaviour of

some human agent (i.e., using a value of **judgement** to assess them), the editorial writer, instead, offered an instance of **appreciation** by way of assessment of these abstract entities.

In the following sections a detailed discussion is provided of the analyses by which these findings and conclusions were derived. The analysis discussed is direct at identifying patterns or tendencies as to uses of the subtypes of attitude (**judgement** vs. **appreciation** vs. **affect**) and the roles played by invoked attitude vs. inscribed attitude.

5. *Dawn*: Attitudinal Positioning Vis-à-vis the Pakistani Authorities

5.1. Analysis

The editorial can broadly be divided into two parts: The first part (the first three paragraphs) evaluates entities which are subsidiary to the primary argumentative purposes of the text: bin Laden and the United States. Whereas the second part (the last two paragraphs) is an assessment of the entity which is the primary attitudinal concern of the editorial: the Pakistani military's behaviour as an American ally in the war on terror (in this paper, we, henceforth, use the term 'primary target' to refer to the entity [or entities], which is the primary attitudinal concern of the text, and 'subsidiary target' to refer to those entities which are in some way secondary to the argumentative purposes). We accordingly concern ourselves here with these last two Pakistan-oriented paragraphs, the first of which deals with the proposition (never explicitly asserted) that the Pakistani military has been duplicitous in its dealings with Osama bin Laden and has been misguided or incompetent in its conduct of the 'war on terror.' The second paragraph develops further the negativity regarding Pakistan's commitment to fight the terrorists. Paragraph 4 begins with this intimation of wrongdoing or possibly incompetence on the part of the Pakistan authorities:

(25) As for Pakistan, the time for denial is over. (potentially invoking negative **judgement** of Pakistan/Pakistan authorities)

This is noteworthy in connection with our proposals to the attitudinal obliqueness of these editorials. To be noted is the use a grammatical grammatical/ideational metaphor ('denial' in 'time of denial'), in place of the author explicitly asserting something like 'Pakistan cannot deny' Secondly, it is not stated what it is that Pakistan cannot deny—presumably, some as yet unspecified failing. It is only in the following sentences that the reader is supplied with material pointing to what it might be that Pakistan can no longer deny. Thirdly, it is to be noted that the target of *Dawn*'s editorial is actually not Pakistan, but the Pakistani military. 'Pakistan' on its own is a vague term in the present context given that there must have been an institution or people that need to be held responsible for giving Osama bin Laden a place to live. The editorial mines the Pakistani readership's common knowledge about the town of Abbottabad being off-limits to civilians as the basis for the invocation that the Pakistani military has been guilty of malfeasance. Thus, *Dawn*'s use of invocation is grounded in an ideational metaphor ('time for denial') and implication ('Pakistan,' implying the Pakistani military) based on popular/national knowledge that only the military could have allowed Osama bin Laden to 'live in a large house surrounded by high walls topped with barbed wire in a garrison town housing a military academy.'

This opening sentence is followed by a version of events:

(26) Osama bin Laden was not holed up in a cave in the tribal agencies. (27) He was living in a large house surrounded by high walls topped with barbed wire in a garrison town housing a military academy.

These 'facts' function to clarify why the author has proposed the 'the time for denial is over' and thereby to invoke a negative assessment of anyone implicated in Osama bin Laden being able to take refuge in a 'large house... in a garrison town housing a military academy.' Given the dominant role that the Pakistani military played at the time in Pakistani politics and society, and in internal security/intelligence, there is an obvious potential for the inference to be drawn that it is the military which is to be blamed.

It is not, however, left to the reader to reach attitudinal conclusions regarding the conduct of the Pakistani military/authorities. This invocatory material is followed by a series of attitudinal inscriptions:

The idea that the world's most wanted criminal [*negative judgement/propriety* -> *target* = *bin Laden*] was spending his days there unnoticed by Pakistani intelligence requires either suspension of disbelief [*negative appreciation/social value*—of 'the idea that. '] or the conclusion that the authorities are guilty of a massive intelligence failure. [*negative judgement/capacity* -> *target* = 'authorities/military']

To be noted is the attitudinal obliqueness of the formulation: ‘The idea [that bin Laden went unnoticed] requires either suspension of disbelief or’ Tellingly, the editorial refrains from directly raising the possibility that, for example, the Pakistani authorities have deceived the people of Pakistan regarding their knowledge of bin Laden’s whereabouts and chooses, instead, to be much more indirect in assessing, not the Pakistani authorities, but an ‘idea’ (that bin Laden went unnoticed) as ‘requiring a suspension of disbelief.’ It is only in the last part of this sentence that we find, finally, a direct inscription of negative **judgement** of the Pakistani authorities—as possibly ‘guilty of a massive intelligence failure.’ Significantly, this overtly inscribed assessment is of **judgement/incapacity** (an instance of socially less serious **social esteem**), rather than of corruption or deception, **judgement/impropriety** (an instance of socially more serious **social sanction**).

Dawn continues to assess Pakistan via assessments which continue this attitudinally oblique approach:

Both hypotheses are disturbing [*inscribed negative appreciation/reaction* → *target = ‘hypotheses’*]. If the former is true, the state must realise that extremist ideology [*inscribed negative appreciation/social value*] has killed thousands of Pakistanis and that there needs to be a single-minded effort [*inscribed positive appreciation social value* → *target = effort*] against it rather than a selective approach [*inscribed negative appreciation/social value* → *target = ‘approach’*] that has failed to keep the country safe. [*inscribed negative appreciation/social value* → *target = ‘selective approach’*] And if the oversight [*inscribed negative judgement/capacity* → *target unspecified*] was a matter of incompetence, [*inscribed negative judgement/capacity* → *target unspecified*] the authorities need to improve their game [*inscribed negative judgement/capacity* → *target = authorities*] drastically.

To be noted here are two features: (i) the use again of ideational metaphor (as mentioned previously) in formulations by which it is possible to deploy instances of **appreciation** rather than what might have been instances of **judgement** and, (ii) in association with this, vagueness as to any human agents which might, otherwise, be directly targeted for assessment. For example, it is asserted that a ‘single-minded effort’ (an assessment of a depersonalized, reified process—an ‘effort’) is needed to counter ‘extremist ideology.’ To characterize someone as being ‘single-mindedly’ engaged in some activity is certainly to praise them for their application and determination—to inscribe a positive assessment of **judgement/tenacity** (being appropriately disposed). Accordingly, to suggest that someone has *failed* to engage single-mindedly with a task is to judge them negatively. Here no particular human agent is being explicitly and directly criticized for having failed to be sufficiently ‘single-minded.’ Rather, what is proposed is a need for an ‘effort’ of this type. It is, thus, left to the reader to interpret this as a criticism of the past actions of the Pakistan authorities. The same mechanism can be observed in the proposal that a ‘selective approach’ has been in operation. Here there is a negative **appreciation** of a particular type of approach, that is, one which is ‘selective.’ Presumably, it is viewed negatively on the basis that it is not comprehensive enough, that it has failed to take certain important aspects into account. This invocation is reinforced by the subsequent assertion, that is, that the selective approach has ‘failed to keep the country safe.’ Again, what the editorial offers is an **appreciation** (negative **social value**) of an abstract entity (‘approach’) rather than a **judgement** of some agent for choosing to tackle some problem in this inadequate way. For example, it might have been asserted that, ‘The Pakistan authorities have been selective in tackling extremist ideology’ or that, ‘The Pakistani authorities have approached extremist ideology very selectively.’ Again, it is left to the reader to supply an interpretation in which it is the Pakistani military authorities who are being assessed negatively. The same mechanisms can be observed in: ‘if the oversight was a matter of incompetence.’ Whereas ‘oversight’ and ‘incompetence’ are labels for assessments of negative **judgement** (negative **capacity**), the use again of ideational metaphor (nominalisations) means that no specific human agent is being directly criticized. It is up to the reader to decide who might be guilty of ‘oversight’ and ‘incompetence.’

It is only in the last clause of this sentence that a human agent (the authorities) is explicitly targeted for assessment: ‘The authorities need to improve their game drastically.’ Nevertheless, the negativity is still circumspect. Significantly, the authorities’ alleged failing is rather vaguely said to be a matter of their ‘game,’ which is in need of ‘improvement.’

This strategy of what we term attitudinal ‘circumspection’ or ‘obliqueness’ is continued in the final paragraph:

(32) Pakistani intelligence and police worked closely with the CIA to take out a number of Al-Qaeda leaders [*invoked positive judgement/capacity* → *target = Pakistani intelligence and police*] ... (33) This is something we clearly know

how to do but no longer seem interested in [*inscribed retracted negative affect/satisfaction—emoter = ‘us’, -> target = ‘taking out Al-Qaeda leaders; invoking a negative judgement of ‘us.’*]

Here, the editorial offers material with the potential to trigger a positive assessment of the prior capabilities of the Pakistani intelligence services, at least, for those readers who would view favourably the Pakistani authorities ‘working with the CIA to take out Al-Qaeda leaders.’ This is counteracted, however, by a proposition as to the Pakistani people’s current affectual disposition to such actions: ‘we no longer seem interested in [this].’ Such a proposition has the potential to invoke a negative judgement of ‘us’—for being uninterested in dealing with terrorists. There are two points to be noted here: (i) the suggestion that ‘we’ (the Pakistani people in general) are subject to this lack of interest (as opposed to the Pakistani authorities), and (ii) the use of an instance of **affect** to act as an invocation of **judgement**. The attitudinal obliqueness observed operating earlier in the text continues as the editorial writer yet again avoids directly targeting the Pakistani authorities and prefers to invoke rather than inscribe negative **judgement**.

The next clause operates along similar attitudinal lines:

the US no longer trusts us [*inscribed retracted observed positive affect/security/trust—emoter = ‘United States’; target—‘us/Pakistan in general’*] enough to plan an operation jointly.

Here, the attitudinal positioning is ‘oblique’ in the sense that, rather than the author passing judgement on the Pakistani authorities, it is an external source (the ‘United States’) which is presented as having a negative view. Again, the use of the generic ‘us’ (Pakistan in general) is in operation rather than any direct targeting of the authorities. The cultural frame being relied on here for the invocation is one by which it is troubling that the ‘US no longer trusts us,’ that a loss of trust by the US is a pointer to a failure on the part of the Pakistani authorities.

Recall that the section of editorial concerned with the failings of the Pakistani authorities began with: ‘As for Pakistan, the time for denial is over.’

The attitudinal obliqueness of this is echoed in the editorial’s concluding sentence: ‘As positive a development as Osama bin Laden’s removal is, for the Pakistani state it should be a moment for deep and honest reflection.’

Again, rather than, for example, explicitly asserting that the Pakistani authorities have failed in the past to ‘honestly reflect’ (inscribed **judgement/veracity**), the author only indirectly raises this as a possibility—the modalised ‘should be a moment for honest reflection’ only potentially implies that ‘honest reflection’ has been missing in the past. Again, it remains unspecified as to what this ‘deep reflection’ should encompass.

5.2. Summary

In summary, clearly the purpose of this text is to motivate the reader to see the authorities as blameworthy (or to reinforce this view in the reader) and hence to recognize that there is a need for change in *The Nation*’s approach to antiterrorism. The key insights with respect to the attitudinal obliqueness with which this position was advanced are as follows. Whereas the reader is positioned to view the authorities as either corrupt and/or deceptive (having lied to the people regarding the knowledge of bin Laden’s whereabouts) or incompetent, this seldom involves inscribed instances of **judgement** in which the authorities are overtly referenced as the target of such assessments. Typically, these assessments are either invoked via attitudinally charged versions of events (e.g., that bin Laden was found living in a large compound in a major city near a military base) or via the kinds of **appreciation** outlined above (e.g., that a “single minded approach” was needed). On the couple of occasions where assessments of negative **judgement** are inscribed, these are values of negative **capacity** (i.e., negative **social esteem**) and not of negative **propriety** or **veracity** (i.e., not instances of negative **social sanction**). As has been discussed previously and widely in the appraisal-framework literature (see Martin & White 2005, chapter 2), assessments of **social esteem** (e.g., **capacity**) are less highly charged interpersonally than assessments of **social sanction** because they do not involve norms codified by reference to religious precepts or civil law.

6. *The Nation*: Attitudinal Positioning Vis-à-vis the US

6.1. Analysis

As indicated, *The Nation*’s primary attitudinal target is the US, and its report of having killed bin Laden. In this chapter, we focus, therefore, on this aspect: the text’s attitudinal orientation.

The opening paragraph (excluding the last two sentences) has a unity of its own as it is exclusively focused on President Obama's announcement about the killing of bin Laden. In attitudinal terms, the opening is a little puzzling because evaluatively it is in sharp contrast to the central editorial contention and the various propositions the editorial offers about the United States. The primary contention in play is that the claim just made by the US about having killed bin Laden is suspicious and is to be regarded sceptically, and yet, at least, at first glance, this opening could be read as potentially positive towards the US in its undertaking of this action. However, it serves a certain functionality as regards reader alignment, which is addressed shortly. The opening of the editorial is reproduced below, with an attitude analysis inserted as appropriate (in the annotation, **bold** has been used to highlight inscriptions which fall within invocations which operate over a widerspan. These invocations are underlined).

President Obama's announcement that Osama bin Laden was 'slain in his luxury hideout in Pakistan' last night sets Washington's seal of confirmation on the death of a man who, the US believed, had struck at the heart of the American mainland with **gruesome effect**. (*nonauthorial inscribed negative appreciation reaction—target -> 'effect'—attributed as what 'the US believed'; 'man who struck ... with gruesome effect'—potential invoked negative judgement/propriety—target -> bin Laden; dependent on the evidential standing of the quoted source*) Thus, the countless hours the multiple US intelligence agencies used to locate his whereabouts and, as estimated by Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz and other **celebrated American economists** (*inscribed positive judgement/capacity -> 'economists'*), the three trillion dollars the Pentagon spent on the war against Iraq alone, not to talk of the expense on the Afghanistan invasion, have now **borne fruit** (*inscribed appreciation -> of the current situation*). US officials maintain that the operation was 'so secretive that no foreign officials were informed in advance, and only a small circle inside the administration was aware of what was unfolding half a world away.' They also stated that 'the CIA tracked bin Laden to his location; then, **elite troops**' (*nonauthorial positive judgement/capacity of 'troops'—attributed to 'US officials'*) from Navy SEAL Team Six, a top military counterterrorism unit, flew to the hideout in four helicopters.'

The initial assessment of the impact of bin Laden on the US as resulting in a 'gruesome effect' might perhaps be suggestive of a positive disposition towards the US, at least, in terms of indicating some degree of empathy or concern for past US experiences. Against this, it needs to be noted that the editorial has chosen not to offer this assessment on its own behalf, choosing instead to attribute this to an external source to present this as what the US 'believes.' There are issues, therefore, of dialogistic positioning and potential consequences for the attitudinal positioning of the reader in such circumstances (i.e., where the attitude being referenced is not that of the author). Of significance for our current purposes is the communicative effective by which the author, by this attribution, refrains from any categorical assertion that bin Laden did, indeed, strike with 'gruesome effect.' In line with the text's strategy of obliqueness, it is left open as to whether this involves anything other than the US's 'belief.'

The account of the 'countless hours' and 'the three trillion dollars' that 'multiple intelligence agencies and the Pentagon' spent in the pursuit of bin Laden does seem to have the potential to invoke a positive assessment of the US for its determination or persistence (hence invoked positive judgement/tenacity), at least, from the perspective of some reading positions. Against this, it needs to be noted that the issues and events involved here are multiple and complex, with the result that the readers may bring different types of knowledge and values to the interpretation of this material. An alternative attitudinal inference would be that the US has been excessive and wasteful, and also possibly inept, in the time and resources it devoted to the task of finding one man ('three trillion dollars' and 'not to talk of the expense on the Afghanistan invasion'), with 'borne fruit' being read ironically, as a kind of back-handed compliment. In line, then, with the strategy of obliqueness, it is apparently left open as to whether the US should be positively or negatively viewed vis-à-vis these events.

As will be outlined below, the negative interpretation is substantially more in line with how the reader is positioned to view the US in the remainder of the editorial. It is also more in line with the headline 'Bin Laden dies again.' The invocatory potential of this curious proposition will be dealt with in more detail below. It is enough at this point of the discussion to note that it is suggestive of a view that things may not be as they seem regarding the US report. There are question marks over the version of events being offered by the US, the version of events by which the US efforts are now said to have 'borne fruit.' Again, in line with the piece's obliqueness, the view is suggested, not overtly asserted.

There are other points of potential negativity towards the US in this opening paragraph, observable upon closer analysis—again hinted at rather than articulated. Consider again the opening sentence: 'President Obama's announcement that Osama bin Laden was slain in his luxury hideout in Pakistan . . .'

The choice of the term *slain* as opposed to *kill* does seem to have some significant attitudinal potential, associated as it is with negative connotations. The following from *Webster's Dictionary of Synonyms* is suggestive:

kill is so general that it merely states the fact and does not, except in special phrases ... suggest human agency or the means of death or the conditions attending the putting to death. Also, the object of the action may be not only a person or other living thing but also an inanimate or immaterial thing with qualities suggestive of life. Slay implies killing by force or in wantonness ... it may convey a dramatic quality ... In its extended uses slay usually suggests wanton or deliberate destruction or annihilation (*Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms*, 1984, p. 479).

For the authors of the dictionary, then, slain is potentially associated with 'wantonness,' that is, negative judgement/propriety. The semanticist Hayakawa (1987, p. 314) takes the same position while distinguishing *kill* from *slay*. He asserts that compared to *kill*, *slay* is closer to slaughter and murder for taking on 'extremely disapproving overtones when applied to the killing of people' and adds the connotations of 'brutal killing' to the word *kill*. A most telling point to be noted here is the fact that, despite that editorialist including 'slain' in a direct quotation, a further investigation reveals President Obama actually did not use the word *slain* in his speech in which he announced the killing of bin Laden. His statement is available online and there bin Laden is said to have been 'killed,' with no instance of *slain* anywhere in that text. Though subtle, this is still surely suggestive of a negativity towards the US to which the reader may be susceptible.

The choice made by the editorial author, later in the paragraph, to baldly report that: 'And Osama was shot in the head' arguably has a similar potential to invoke a negative view of the US in undertaking this action. This is, at least, to the extent that this might be suggestive of a very deliberate and controlled act on the part of the soldiers, that is, execution style rather than a killing in the chaos and heat of a military assault. In this opening paragraph, then, there is evidence of an evaluative style which is even more 'oblique' or 'circumspect' than the attitudinal style already discussed with respect to the *Dawn* editorial in the sense that here, at least, some elements of potential positivity towards the primary target are provided, only to be counterbalanced and undermined by hints of negativity.

This opening paragraph provides material which hints at negativity towards the US for its action against bin Laden. In the next paragraph, the focus sharpens to be more directly concerned with the US's account of the action, specifically to position the reader to view the account as dubious, unreliable, inconsistent, or otherwise suspect. The first layer of attitudinal positioning is, thus, a matter of **appreciation**, that is, a negative assessment of a version of events. Certainly, there is an additional layer of attitudinal positioning directed at the source of such a purportedly suspect account—an invoked assessment of the US/Obama as unreliable, duplicitous, dissembling, and so on (invoked negative **judgement/veracity**). The mechanism deployed is to interlace reporting of the US account with material which casts doubt on its plausibility. The focus is on the plausibility/implausibility of bin Laden having been able to remain hidden from the Pakistani authorities while living in such a large compound situated so close to a military academy.

(7) Interestingly, considering the details being given out of the hideout, there is little doubt that it does not suit a person with a head money as high as \$50 million. (8) A large custom-built \$1 million mansion, with a surrounding wall tall enough to hide the ground floor and reinforced with barbed wire, and two heavily-guarded security gates would easily attract suspicion from not only intelligence agencies but also the ordinary folks. (9) Besides, it was housing, so the US story goes, Osama bin Laden, his three wives, seven sons and several guards. (10) Al-Qaeda leader was killed along with one of his sons and three guards, and the rest were arrested. (11) Unquestionably, to the Americans all were identifiable objects or did they never step out of their home? (12) But that would set tongues wagging, confirm the suspicion of mystery around the place and prompt serious investigation. (13) Then, the released picture of dead Osama does not show the age he must be in at this time.

The key point to be made is that nowhere is there any explicit assessment of the account as inaccurate, implausible, or otherwise suspect, nor is there any explicit assessment of the US/President Obama as an unreliable source. The positioning relies on the reader accepting the 'logic' of what is being presented, that is, seeing as virtually impossible that the world's most wanted man could remain undetected in a 'a custom-built \$1 million mansion' and, then, concluding that the US account must in some way be inaccurate, incomplete, or otherwise suspect. Interestingly, the particular conclusion that the reader is invited to reach—that the US account cannot be trusted—is very different from the conclusions which readers of the *Dawn* editorial were invited to reach, based on the same perceived incongruity. There, of course, the inconsistency (bin Laden's whereabouts not being revealed while he lived in such a location) is treated as

leading not to the inference that the US is dissembling but that either bin Laden had, indeed, been detected and the Pakistani authorities were complicit in sheltering him or that the authorities were thereby revealed as grossly incompetent.

The positioning by which the reader is directed to suspect the US and its version of events, rather than to question the behaviour of the Pakistani authorities, is quite subtle. In this paragraph, it is largely confined to just two elements. Firstly, there is the insertion of ‘so the US story goes’ in ‘Besides, it was housing, so the US story goes, Osama bin Laden, his three wives, seven sons and several guards.’ This again is a matter of dialogistic positioning, specifically of attribution. To be noted is that, by this formulation, the author keeps the focus on the US, as disseminators of this particular version of events, and hence away from the Pakistani authorities who might, otherwise, be potentially implicated. Simultaneously, by use of this formulation ‘so the story goes,’ the author subtly introduces the possibility that the account is, indeed, just a ‘story’ and hence open to question. Secondly there is the offering, in the final sentence of the paragraph, of an isolated detail of the events under consideration: ‘Then, the released picture of dead Osama does not show the age he must be in at this time.’ This makes substantial interpretative demands of the reader if they are to integrate this into the text as a whole. What is the significance of this detail, one might ask? It only makes sense if one assumes that this is in some way untoward, as going against what would be expected. On the basis of such an assumption, one might, then, conclude that the US had something to hide, or that they did not, in fact, have a current picture of bin Laden, taken at the time. By this, then, attention is directed again to the US and potential assessments of its behaviour as untrustworthy or duplicitous, rather than to the behaviour of the Pakistani authorities. The reader is pointed to the possibility that some parts or all of the account are a fabrication or, at least, inaccurate in some way.

This, then, is again a case of attitudinally oblique style, involving as it does what might be termed weak or faint attitudinal invocation, invocations where substantial interpretative work is required of the reader and where that reader needs to bring a particular set of beliefs and expectations to the text. These would seem to include a disposition towards scepticism vis-à-vis statements released by the US government.

The next paragraph is largely confined to outlining some presumably negative consequences of the US issuing this report:

(14) The drama, it seems, has been staged to put the blame of hiding him on Pakistan. (15) That would give credibility to the accusation that it provides sanctuaries to other Al-Qaeda operatives who are behind the deaths of US and NATO soldiers. (16) Already, the Indian Home Minister has picked up the hint and said that Pakistan has sanctuaries of terrorists. (17) These tactics would tend to provide justification for more drone attacks and more intense pressure on Islamabad to send its forces to North Waziristan.

To the extent that the reader does view these consequences as negative (e.g., resulting in more pressure for drone attacks, and the Indian Home Minister saying Pakistan has sanctuaries for terrorists), then that negativity might redound on the US as the cause of these negative outcomes, that is, act as further invocation of negativity towards the US. The first sentence of the paragraph is somewhat more directly invocatory of such negativity. It shifts the focus back to the US itself (as an actor in current events), from the prior focus on the US announcement: ‘(14) The drama, it seems, has been staged to put the blame of hiding him on Pakistan. (invoked negative **judgement/propriety**—target -> the US)’

This is certainly invocatory for those readers for whom it would be wrong to ascribe blame to Pakistan for this. Two choices as to wordings merit further mention, that is, lexical items which are interestingly ambiguous in terms of their attitudinal potential. The editorial asserts that, in order to put the blame on Pakistan, a ‘drama’ has been ‘staged.’ Firstly, it is unclear as to precisely what is being referenced and characterized via the term ‘drama.’ Does ‘drama’ refer to the military action of killing bin Laden himself or to the US announcing his killing and making these various claims? There is, then, ambiguity as to whether ‘drama’ is simply to be taken as descriptive of the impactful nature of the events that have occurred or it is meant to hint at some element of theatricality, that there is a fictional aspect in play. The term ‘to stage’ carries similar potential connotations⁴, given that one sense of the term references a process which is deliberately organized for public effect. Again, the attitudinal positioning is tangential and subtle, involving ambiguous lexis and dependent on the reader adopting one of the available meanings entailed in that ambiguity.

The final paragraph begins with material that provides perhaps the most deliberate guidance to the reader as to how they should regard the version of events being offered by the US with suspicion:

(18) While the death of Osama, as Marine Colonel Bob Pappas has been saying for years, might have taken place at Tora Bora on December 13, 2001, or any time later, as other media reports suggested, its ‘occurrence’ now would boost the morale of the GIs losing the war in Afghanistan.

Here, the mechanism is to provide an alternative, at-odds version of events, one by which bin Laden could not have just been killed because he was already dead. This echoes and explains the apparent incongruity of the headline: ‘Bin Laden dies again’ already mentioned above. With respect to attitudinal values, the key point is that the reader is positioned to favourably view this rival version of events, to view it as having epistemic substance. Through this, of course, the reader is further positioned to regard as suspicious the version of events just advanced by the US. Also, to be noted is the strategic use of scare quotes around ‘occurrence’ in ‘its [bin Laden’s death] ‘occurrence’ now.’ That the killing of bin Laden has, indeed, ‘occurred’ is construed as open to question, as a proposition which the editorial does not endorse.

6.1. Summary

The features just discussed provide the grounds for characterizing the attitudinal positioning vis-à-vis the US as oblique and, perhaps, even more oblique than was the case with the *Dawn* editorial. Whereas *Dawn* favoured invocation over inscription, it did include a few inscribed negative assessments of their primary attitudinal target (Pakistan), and even some instances of inscribed negative **judgement**. In contrast, the editorial of *The Nation* relied exclusively on invocation, that is, with no instances of inscribed attitude targeted directly at the US.

7. Conclusion

According to the World Press Freedom Index, Pakistan is one of the world’s most dangerous countries for journalists (*Dawn*, 3 November 2017; Cook, 21 December 2017; Siddiqui, 6 April 2018). Various scholars have pointed out extreme dangers that Pakistani journalists face (e.g., Aslam, 2015; Jamil, 2019). The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) website lists consistent state-backed violence against journalists in Pakistan, including being jailed, assaulted, or killed for writing or speaking against the ‘national’ interests (another name for the military’s interests).

Historically, the Pakistani military has been the nation’s supreme civilian, political authority. It has imposed martial law multiple times in the past and has allegedly been responsible for the killings of dissidents in the name of Islam and national security. According to Fair (2014, p. 5), the ‘Pakistan Army sees itself as responsible for protecting not only Pakistan’s territorial frontiers but also its ideological frontiers.’ Many scholars (e.g., Ganguly & Fair, 2013; Shah, 2014) have pointed out how the military, especially the army, dominates almost the entire civilian landscape of Pakistan.

Pakistan has been categorized as a Praetorian state (Rizvi, 2005), a garrison state (Ahmed, 2013), and a warrior state (Paul, 2014) in which the military dominates social, political, and economic matters. According to Rizvi:

Pakistan can be described as a Praetorian state where the military has acquired the capability, will, and sufficient experience to dominate the core political institutions and processes. As the political forces are disparate and weak, the military’s disposition has a strong impact on the course of political change, including the transfer of power from one set of the elite to another. (Rizvi, 2005, p. 301)

As a Praetorian state, the military has assigned to itself the role of the custodian of Pakistan’s physical and ideological cartography, which has led to perceptions of conspiracies and machinations from inside the country and abroad. Any potentially dangerous or threatening situation is often interpreted as having an ‘anti-Pakistan’ source (e.g., Haqqani, 2005; Siddiqua, 2007).

The manner of the reported killing of bin Laden by the US forces would seem to have cast a serious shadow of the Pakistani military. And yet, it was not open to the newspapers to challenge the military in any forthright manner. Given these circumstances it is surely unsurprising that both these newspapers should choose to deploy the attitudinally oblique style we have described above. This rhetorical strategy can plausibly be seen as conditioned by these specific circumstances.

Of course, whereas both the newspapers deploy similar attitudinal styles, they do so from very different ideological perspectives and with very different argumentative objectives in mind. *Dawn* is oblique in levelling charges of corruption and incompetence at the military. In contrast, *The Nation* has intriguingly chosen to find an alternative

powerful state entity at which to obliquely level charges—the United States of America. This would seem to be consonant with a ‘conservative’ pro Pakistani military line, a way to draw attention away from any failings on the part of the local authorities. Of course, this means that, that it needs to covertly accuse the current US President and its military of lying, of a gross fabrication of the facts. At the time (prior to the Trump years) this was a relatively challenging undertaking for any news media organization (even given well documented prior cases of mendacity—e.g., claims of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the claims of the attacks on US destroyers which started the US/Vietnamese war). Again, there were obvious impulses for the newspaper not to be attitudinally overt, but to rely on inferences and the assumption that the intended reader would share with newspaper key underlying beliefs, values, and expectations.

Given that the analysis reported here involved just two newspaper editorials, our findings as to this impulse to attitudinal obliqueness are obviously not generalizable in any obvious way. The possibility remains that editorials more widely, as opposed to by-lined opinion columns, may tend towards attitudinal vagueness, may as a matter of course choose to be less than forthright, as a reflex of their function in articulating a corporate, institutional viewpoint. We are not aware of any other studies of editorials which could provide answers to such questions. Nevertheless, we believe it is plausible that there is a relationship between this attitudinal style and the fact the editorials were confronting extremely powerful institutional entities. Our study points the way forward for further studies of journalistic opinion to determine if it varies between attitudinal obliqueness and forthrightness depending on the power and status of who or what is being challenged.

Notes

¹The Pakistan constitution forbids criticism of the military. For example, even members of parliament are forbidden from mounting such criticisms, with the constitution stating that elected members will lose their seats in parliament if they ‘have been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction for propagating any opinion, or acting in any manner, prejudicial to the ideology of Pakistan, or the sovereignty, integrity or security of Pakistan, or the integrity or independence of the judiciary of Pakistan, or which defames or brings into ridicule the judiciary or the Armed Forces of Pakistan...’

²For a detailed account of the taxonomic principles underlying this categorization, see Martin and White 2005: 52-56.

³<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-dead>

⁴<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/stage> - ‘stage’ - ‘to cause to happen for public effect.’


Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.

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